By Aparna Pande
This article appeared in Chowk on May 30, 2007
Among the oldest civilizations in the world India and Iran have had historic ties for centuries. Even now, the two countries had retain historical and civilizational ties, deep cultural affinities, as well as a common point of view on many regional issues.
The Indo-Aryans crossed over Iran on their way to India. The name Hind comes from the name given to the land of the river Indus given by the ancient Persians. India also has a significant minority of Zoroastrians or Parsis (as they are called) who fled Persia and sought refuge in India. This migration would not have been possible if close relations had not existed between the Persian and Indian civilizations.
The Muslim rulers who settled in northern India from the twelfth century onwards often attempted to control present day Iran. The relations between the Khalji-Tughlak-Lodhi and later Mughal dynasties and the Persian kingdom were intermittently harmonious and violent.
Whenever India and Persia felt threatened by the far off Ottomans or other rulers they would come together but when there was no external threat they often fought over what is present day Afghanistan. This concern for Afghanistan can be seen even today. Though the major Muslim empires in India were led by Sunni Muslims many of the smaller kingdoms in south India were either led by Shia kings or had very close ties to Persia.
Modern day India’s relations with Iran have been warm at times and cordial at others. Under the Shah’s regime the close ties between Iran and Pakistan cast a shadow on Indo-Iranian ties. Iran under the Shah was an American ally and acted in favor of Pakistan, another U.S. protégé.
Iran’s regime after the revolution of 1979 has always maintained good relations with India. Strategically both Iran and India fear Pakistan’s presence and influence in Afghanistan. During the Cold War the rising influence of Saudi-sponsored and Pakistan-aided Wahhabism threatened both India and Iran. India has a large Shia minority and this Shia minority has historically maintained very close links with Iran.
With the expansion of India’s economy reflected in high growth rates, beginning in the late 1990s, there have been renewed economic ties between India and Iran.
In April 2001 Iran’s President Mohammed Khatami and India’s Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee signed the Teheran Declaration. The declaration stressed their common views on Afghanistan and the need for cooperation in the spheres of industry, agriculture, transportation and the services sector. Iran also promised to take India’s sensitivities on the Kashmir issue into consideration.
India’s energy demands are growing exponentially. India currently imports 70% of the crude oil it needs and its energy demands, both in oil and gas, will double by 2020. Even though India has developed nuclear energy as an alternate power source for years, atomic power accounts for only 2.7% of India’s total energy production. Just as India needs energy-rich countries like Iran as partners, so do the latter need markets for their energy resources.
India has been keen on purchasing Iranian natural gas and there have been talks over the 2,700 km-long Iran-Pakistan-India (IPI) pipeline. India and Iran signed an agreement in June 2006 worth $22bn according to which Iran would supply five million tonnes of gas every year to India.
However, the planned pipeline faces several hurdles. The tensions between India and Pakistan and Pakistan and Iran have made it difficult to follow through on the original agreement. Also at the international level, the United States, has been pressurizing India and Pakistan not to go ahead with the deal, which Washington views with suspicion. The U.S. wants Iran to remain internationally isolated until its disagreements with Teheran are resolved.
In addition, the IPI pipeline plans have also been adversely affected by disagreements over pricing.
Strategically, the worsening crisis in Afghanistan has brought India and Iran closer. During the 1990s both India and Iran supported different factions of the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance as they feared a Pakistan-based Sunni-Pashtun regime in Afghanistan.
India and Iran also share worries over the rise in Pakistan of extremist Sunni radical groups, often splinter groups or allies of the Taliban and the Al Qaeda. Afghanistan’s Karzai government has received massive amounts of aid from both India and Iran. India depends mainly on Iran for aid supplies to and trade with Afghanistan. Pakistan still does not allow India overland transit to Afghanistan.
The nuclear issue is one of divergence of opinion. Iran is a signatory to the NPT whereas India never signed the NPT. Iran has often voted against India in the international meetings on the NPT. India, since 1998, has been a declared nuclear weapons-state. However, India does not want another nuclear power in its neighborhood and so has advised Iran to abide by its NPT commitments.
India opposes harsh sanctions against Iran and wants a peaceful diplomatic resolution of the crisis created by Iran’s alleged pursuit of nuclear weapons. However, India voted in the IAEA against Iran which enabled the issue to be reported to the United Nations Security Council, resulting in tough sanctions on Iran.
Even after India’s vote against Iran on the nuclear issue both sides have played down the significance of their divergence of views on this matter.
India maintains that its relationship with Iran cannot be reduced to the two votes New Delhi cast against Teheran at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in September 2005 and February 2006. India also points out that Iran had voted several times against India on Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty matters at the IAEA, “but we don’t say Iran is against India”.
Not all elements of the Indian elite and parties were pleased at India’s vote. In a twist often only seen in Indian politics, both India’s left-wing and right wing parties expressed strong disapproval of the vote. For the left-wing parties this “diminished India’s standing among the developing and non-aligned countries.” According to the right-wing BJP this was an example of kow-towing to American interests.
The Iranian side maintained that nothing has changed in the fundamentals of Indo-Iran ties after the IAEA votes. As Iran’s energy minister recently pointed out the bilateral relationship and shared culture between the two countries was “deeper than these issues.”
In a recent visit to India, Iran’s naval chief Rear Admiral Sajjad Kouchaki, termed military relations between the two countries “historical”. Iran has started a 5-year military modernization plan to build up its defense capabilities and hence wants to expand its military ties with India, China and Russia.
One of the key aims of Admiral Kouchaki’s trip was to implement various clauses of a four-year old protocol signed between the two countries for cooperation in the field of naval training and defense. This would include deployment of naval forces in the Oman Sea and the Indian Ocean, anti-terrorism cooperation and search and rescue centers in both countries.
Many Indian scholars emphasize the need for India to engage with neighbors with whom one has historic ties and economic potential in order to balance Eurocentrism or a Westward orientation. Relations with Iran fits these demands for an Indian foreign policy that is not subservient to western nations.
Lacking direct access to Central Asia, India sees Iran as a useful gateway to the markets and natural resources of that region. Also by developing close ties with Iran – an important Muslim country – India hopes to neutralize the Pakistani propaganda on Kashmir.
Iran hopes to break its international isolation by befriending India –a growing regional and global power. Also as one of world’s biggest producers of natural gas, Iran seeks to take advantage of the ready market in India. Iran also hopes to benefit from India’s expertise in information technology and to build close defense ties.
Notwithstanding the deep historic connections and shared strategic interests, there are also key points of divergence between Iran and India. A large part of the Iranian leadership is wary of a strong Hindu-dominated India, while New Delhi views Iran as a potential regional adversary in the long run.
Yet the two countries need each other economically. One (Iran) has the world’s second largest gas reserves and the other (India) is one of the world’s largest gas importers. Strategically both have an incentive to cooperate against the rising Jihadism in the region, albeit for different reasons. An Indian partnership with Iran in the first decade of the twenty-first century seems as natural as the linkages between the ancient Persian civilization and ancient India.