By Aparna Pande
This article appeared in Indolink on September 1, 2006
Legitimacy, whether of direct or indirect occupation, comes from both brute force and hegemony. If the British had relied on sheer brute force they would not have lasted in the Indian sub-continent beyond a few decades; they stayed for 200 years. The lesson for the Americans, especially in Iraq, is to maybe learn from both the successes and mistakes of the British.
Demographically speaking the odds were against the British, yet the Company Raj and later the British Raj lasted for 200 years. In 1858 there were 10,000 British officers and 200,00 Indian sepoys ruling over 300 million Indians. How were the British able to do this? Mahatma Gandhi’s critique of the British empire started from his criticism of his fellow Indians. He never failed to point out that the ‘Company Bahadur’ – the name for the British rule in colloquial language – was able to become the Raj only because it had collaborators and support. He used to often say, “who has made the Company Bahadur ‘bahadur’ but us.” The sepoys who fought for the East India Company, the princes who formed part of the British Raj – 562 princely states in 1947 – the various administrative officials at every level of the government were all Indians.
The roots of the British rule lay in a continuation of the policies initiated by the East India Company. The main aim of the Company being profit, ties were encouraged both with local rulers as well as with the regional Mughal governors. At the Mughal court too right from the sixteenth century onwards attempts were made to gain a foothold. Initially the aim was to ensure that the local police or thugs did not hinder trade, later on it was expanded to include tax concessions and ultimately exclusive rights to trade in certain commodities.
The ‘gun and flag did follow the boat’ but almost hundred years later; by which time the ‘Company Bahadur’ had become an economic and political entity of its own. Any early attempts at establishing an empire would have led the British to face an insurgency, on the lines of the 1857 revolt, only much sooner and the future may have been different. By 1857 the East India Company had sympathetic native princes, collaborators and an army of trained soldiers. They also had money, arms and equipment to crush the uprising.
Despite this Tantia Tope, Azimullah Khan put up tough fights. It was the mutiny of British sepoys aided by erstwhile collaborators – native rulers – in various towns of Northern and Western India that really shook the British East India Company’s rule. The attempts by the Company to take over native kingdoms and the disproportionate ratio of British to Indian soldiers in the army were blamed. Post 1858 and till 1947 the British Raj maintained cordial and close links with the native princes – though interference in their kingdoms continued the aura of ‘native rule’ was maintained under the doctrine of Paramountcy.
In 1945 America emerged triumphant from the World War and very soon adopted – some say it was handed over – the British mantle. America saw British successes but never learnt from the British mistakes. The belief that ‘America’ and ‘Americans’ were different because they had left the Old World, had different ideals and would not behave in the same fashion was too ingrained to think otherwise. That is the tragedy of the American empire in Iraq. They followed neither East India’s policy of small force with a large number of collaborators nor the British Raj’s policy of a large force which after subduing the natives built very strong ties with them.
If in the initial period under Garner and Bremer the Iraqi army the Americans had followed Robert Clive’s example – an officer of the British East India Company responsible for the establishment of the Company Raj – they would have succeeded. Clive incorporated the armies of the native princes after making examples of a few top-level officers; the message went down the ranks. This army could have been used for suppressing any future revolts; an army of Iraqis supervised by Americans. The American stock in the Iraqi eyes being very high initially this policy would have helped gain legitimacy for other American actions. British style collaborators could have been found, beyond the Iraqi emigre community in USA most of whom hadn’ t been to Iraq in over 20 years. The British created Rai Bahadurs and Raja Sahibs in India, the local lords and clerics could have at least been co-opted and talked with.
America and American policy makers have often blamed the British legacy in the Middle East and South Asia for their troubles and for the reason why ‘America is hated in the Muslim world.’ That cannot be denied. What is forgotten is that it is more important to learn from your failures than your successes. The British empire lasted for 200-300 years only because they learnt from their mistakes; it collapsed when they became overconfident and stopped learning.