This piece was published in The Friday Times on May 6, 2011

For two decades, the American intelligence has been fixated with the capture of Osama bin Laden, the leader of Al Qaeda. Global intelligence agencies had been after him for almost a decade. His low-key, less-than-dramatic killing is in many ways just ideal. It is also a great opportunity to restructure frayed US-Pakistan ties.

Osama bin Laden was dangerous primarily because of his ability to inspire young men and women around the world to follow his lead and kill themselves and others in the mistaken hope that they were creating a better future for their fellow Muslims. Over the years, a certain aura and superhuman qualities had been associated with his personality. Saddam Hussein’s machismo was struck a blow when he was caught inside a hole in the ground by American troops. Osama bin Laden’s capture and death in a gunfight and his quiet burial at sea will go a long way in reducing his mystique for many of his sympathisers and supporters.

If it is true that the operation was targeted to kill Osama bin Laden rather than capture him, then the aim was well thought out. Capturing bin Laden would have involved bringing him to Guantanamo and keeping him alive while he was being tried. The resultant media attention and debate over use of torture or whether the trial should be civil or military would have only provided Osama and his supporters a public forum to appeal to the wider Muslim world.

Osama bin Laden’s death is a tremendous victory for American foreign policy especially for the Obama administration. The current US Af-Pak policy aims to “disrupt, dismantle and defeat Al Qaeda”. With the death of bin Laden it will be much easier to make the argument that part of the policy goal has been achieved. This will also help the administration build the argument for troop drawdown and withdrawal from Afghanistan later this year, bearing in mind the 2012 elections.

This is in some ways a vindication of the current strategy being pursued in Afghanistan and Pakistan of increased reliance on CIA intelligence operations and special forces. Moving General Petraeus to the CIA will most likely boost this strategy.

During his speech on May 1, President Obama thanked President Asif Zardari and stated that Osama Bin Laden’s death exemplified the deep counter-terrorism cooperation between Pakistan and the US. The presence of Osama Bin Laden in a city less than 75 miles from Islamabad is to a certain degree embarrassing for the government of Pakistan, especially if we remember the repeated statements made by former president General Pervez Musharraf that bin Laden was not in Pakistan and was probably dead.

While we will have to wait for details to emerge, it is important to remember is that such an operation could not have been conducted without Pakistani military-intelligence cooperation. It would not have been possible for American helicopters to land deep inside Pakistani territory and for US Navy Seals to conduct the operation.

Fear of reprisal by Al Qaeda and its allied groups within Pakistan is probably the main reason why Pakistani military-intelligence officials are not openly acknowledging the extent of the cooperation. The incident has taken place soon after the Raymond Davis case when anti-American sentiments and anger against American operations within Pakistan are high.

Another reason for the Pakistani establishment’s silence could be that the capture of Osama bin Laden is part of a quid pro quo vis-à-vis Afghanistan. The Americans accepting a greater Pakistani role in reconciliation and rehabilitation in Afghanistan would be a welcome bargain. Whether it happens or not is a different issue.

This is, however, an opportune moment for the Obama administration to mend ties with Pakistan and provide much-needed vocal and monetary support to the civilian government. Announcements of President Zardari’s visit to Washington and President Obama’s visit to Pakistan would be helpful.

Secretary Clinton is due in Islamabad in end-May to participate in the next round of the US-Pakistan strategic dialogue. There is a multidimensional focus to this dialogue with thirteen working groups focusing on areas as diverse as agriculture, communications, defence, economy, energy, health, law enforcement and counter-terrorism, water, and women’s empowerment. A team of Pakistani civilian and military officials is currently in Washington to participate in the defence working group.

Pakistan’s economy is in dire straits and requires the IMF assistance programme to continue, in addition to aid and trade with the United States. While the Kerry-Lugar-Berman bill of 2009 offered Pakistan $7.5 billion in civilian aid over five years, as pointed out in a recent US GAO report, most of the money has not been disbursed as yet. Studies have shown that American aid is appreciated and helps reduce anti-Americanism. Also, the Reconstruction Opportunity Zones (ROZs) designed to provide special economic assistance to the tribal regions have yet to be set up.

While the Pakistani security establishment’s worldview does not match that of the US, boosting the civilian side of the Pakistani state – which shares the American worldview – is critical. Supporting civilian, democratic and liberal forces in Pakistan would help American goals in South Asia and the greater Middle East. While a stable democratic Pakistan is still some years in the future, timely support to the civilian elements who want to bring that change is vital.

Aparna Pande is a research fellow at Hudson Institute, Washington DC. Her book Explaining Pakistan’s Foreign Policy: Escaping India (Routledge, 2011) has just been published