By Aparna Pande
This article appeared in Indolink on October 30, 2006
Two weeks from today, in mid-November, foreign secretary level talks will be held between India and Pakistan. The background for this lay in the talks between President Musharraf and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh when they met, on the sidelines of the NAM summit in Havana, in September 2006.
One of the key decisions was the setting up of an anti-terrorism institutional mechanism to identify and implement counter-terrorism initiatives and investigations.
On the eve of these talks it is necessary to look at the history of counter-terrorism policies of India and Pakistan to look at the obstacles that lie ahead.
India has been fighting terrorism in various parts of its country for over two decades. Pakistan is America’s key ally and ‘frontline state’ in the ‘global war against terror.’ Yet the roots of jihadism in South Asia have only deepened not lessened.
Clearly, the response mechanisms evolved thus far have not been sufficient or effective. Indeed, a valid concern has often been voiced on whether India and Pakistan have any coherent, consistent or effective policies against jihadist terror.
India and Pakistan used the post-9/11 ‘global war against terrorism’ to their advantage.
India portrayed the problem in Jammu and Kashmir as purely a matter of combating ‘cross-border terrorism’, thus making the case that it has a right to pursue terrorists operating from Pakistan; a right it has steadfastly refused to exercise.
India also strongly argued that there should be no double standards in the global fight against terrorism reiterating its demand that the US categorize Pakistan as a state sponsor of terrorism or at least force Pakistan to stop aiding the jihadis entering India.
Other planks of India’s counter terrorism policy have been increased deployment of personnel on the borders and attempts to fence the border in key areas.
Pakistan used its status as a ‘frontline state’ and an ‘ally’ in America’s global war against terror to secure substantial economic aid and approbation from the West. Yet Pakistan continued its policy of seeking to ‘bleed India’ in Kashmir.
Pakistani governments over the years have made repeated attempts to internationalize the Kashmir issue. The 1948 and 1965 wars were attempts to win Kashmir by force.
The failure to win back Kashmir via open warfare led the Pakistani military and intelligence services to adopt a policy of covert war in Kashmir from the late 1980s onwards. The 1999 Kargil conflict was a continuation of this policy; tactically brilliant it lacked political and military forethought.
General Musharraf, echoing the line of Pakistan’s previous military rulers, is willing to help America find any ‘foreign jihadis’ (aka Osama Bin Laden and the Al Qaeda) but is not willing to subdue any ‘local jihadis’ (including the Taliban) or ‘freedom fighters’ (aka Kashmiri jihadi groups).
This can be seen in the increasing evidence that the Pakistani military and intelligence establishment has been providing continuous aid to the Taliban in Afghanistan. With increasing American, and world, preoccupation with Iraq there has been less focus on Afghanistan; the rising number of suicide attacks in Afghanistan and the growth in the Taliban forces is evidence itself.
President Pervez Musharraf keeps reiterating that he cannot take any more steps against extremist groups himself, and that the US should support his agenda or risk facing a new Islamist Government in Pakistan that could be far less accommodating of the latter’s interests in the region.
Five years after September 11, 2001 and two weeks before the fifth anniversary of the terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament what we see is that India still operates within a reactive, rather than proactive, context, with no strategic consistency, and little tactical coherence in its counter-terrorism policies.
Pakistan’s policy, though negative and counter-productive in nature, reflects strategic and tactical coherence. This has meant continuing with the policy of jihad in Afghanistan and Kashmir started in the 1980s-90s.
India has lost over 18,000 civilians and 7,000 security force personnel in the last 20 years to terrorism. In 2006 alone India has lost 1000 civilians and 300 security force personnel and Pakistan has lost over 500 civilians and 300 security force personnel.
Maybe it is time both countries changed their policies and worked together to find a better future for their citizens. But is that possible in an environment where neither country trusts the other.