By Aparna Pande
This article appeared in Indolink on August 14, 2006

July 11, 2006 the city of Bombay faced a series of 7 blasts in which 207 people lost their lives and over 700 were injured. A little known terrorist organization, Lashkar-e-Qahhar, with links to the Lashkar-e-Tayyaba claimed responsibility. Most of the 300 suspects detained by the Indian government are Muslims with links to the Student Islamic Movement of India and the Lashkar e Tayyaba. In the recent terror plot uncovered in London, 24 suspected terrorists have been arrested; most of them British Muslims of Pakistani descent, between 17 to 35 years of age. 

Security and intelligence agencies have lost no time in pointing to the imprint of Al Qaeda in these incidents. A quick glance around the world shows us that whether it is the terror plot in London, the blasts in Bombay, the insurgency and civil war in Iraq or the ongoing war in the Middle East – for intelligence agencies world wide Al Qaeda seems to be behind all these incidents.

So does Al Qaeda have a really large organizational set up with training camps, like those created in Afghanistan during the anti-Soviet Afghan jihad of the 1980s, in different countries? If not, then what is Al Qaeda and how does it influence all these incidents?

 

What is key is that Al Qaeda has mutated and changed since 9/11. Al Qaeda is actually ‘Al Qaedaism’ now, more of an ideology than an organization. There is no need for Osama Bin Laden or Ayman al-Zawahiri to organize attacks any more. They have inspired a new generation of recruits, of jihadis who though not tied to them organizationally are tied to them ideologically and inspired by them.

 

Every society has some ‘lone wolves’ – young people who are disgruntled and angry at both the state and society. They could be highly educated but unemployed young men or women. Or they could be young people caught in this tussle between tradition and modernity. The increasing turn of people, especially the youth, to ideologically oriented movements is an attempt by people to hold on to those core beliefs they feel are being wiped out by modernization; if possible go back to a world that was more certain and more predictable.

 

Before the 1990s any such individuals or groups would have had to join an organization in order to vent their frustration against state and society. Today modern technology is at their disposal. The training camps in Afghanistan were useful only as the enemy was a conventional army, like during the Afghan jihad. With the rise of urban warfare since the 1990s no elaborate set up was needed. Jihadi trainers were already present both within Al Qaeda and its numerous allied organizations whether the Kashmiri jihadi groups like Lashkar-e-Tayyaba in Pakistan or the Abu Sayyaf group in Philippines.

 

Sophisticated communication technology and the growth of the internet has helped small groups of ‘Al Qaeda’ inspired cells come up around the world who ran their own network. The ‘Al Qaeda Manual’ could be downloaded freely, chat rooms were there for exchanging information and websites were created to disseminate information to the wider public. These cells help the lone wolves get training and then the latter are free to do what they want – there is no hierarchy giving out instructions or keeping a control on them. They simply strike when the opportunities for disruption or chaos present themselves. The only connection the 2005 London bombers had with Al Qaeda was that they had attended madrassas in Pakistan. They had also obtained some training with one of the Kashmiri jihadi groups; not directly with Al Qaeda. The chemicals and other material used by both the 2005 London bombers and the 2006 London terror plotters are not very sophisticated or difficult to obtain explosives: rather very simple, easy to obtain and easy to manufacture.

 

So is there any way out, any way of preventing more and more lone wolves from coming up around the world? Like other terrorist organizations these radical jihadis act to have an impact. They play to a target audience, bystanders and the enemy -the aim is to hurt the enemy (i.e the US and its allies), to co-opt the bystander (the Muslim ummah) and to gain recruits from the target audience (Muslim youth). As Ayman al-Zawahiri said in his work ‘Knights under the Banner of the Prophet’ “We must mobilize the nation in the battle of Islam against unbelief.We caution against the risk of Muslim vanguards being killed in silence.”

 

Though it may be impossible to totally eliminate any radical fringe from society what needs to be done is to prevent its growth and its appeal. The way out is finding long-term solutions to some of the causes underlying the popularity of these radical Islamist movements and ideologies. Widespread socio-economic inequality, lack of political participation and lack of employment opportunities are important but so are cultural issues. The impact of conflicts around the world in which Muslims seem to be at the receiving end – whether it be Lebanon, Palestine or Sudan or Kashmir – only increase the sense of persecution and victim hood. Long lasting solutions for these conflicts are, democratic and transparent governments in Muslim countries and investment in the economy to raise employment levels. Last but not least there is also a need to avoid blaming an entire community for the acts of a few.