This article was published in The Friday Times on June 17, 2011

Rahiman dhaga prem ka, mat todo chatkaye,
Tootey se phir naa jurrey, jurrey gaanth lag jaye

(Rahim says do not break by snapping the thread that is love,
Once broken, it will not join; If it does join, there will be a knot)

 

Pakistan’s civilian leadership has a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to change the country’s relationship with the US from being military-intelligence oriented to civilian oriented.

 

US-Pakistan ties are back from the brink but have not normalised completely, and it may be useful for Pakistan’s leaders to understand what has changed. Pakistan’s leaders, both civilian and military, are used to brinkmanship in their relationship with India. However, the belief of Pakistani leaders that raising the rhetoric by using domestic public opinion will force the other country to the negotiating table has worked only sometimes with India. Four times in the past it has resulted in war. And it has rarely resulted in an ideal result for Pakistan.

Even if this strategy would work with a neighbour who is six times larger, faces numerous internal security threats and is a developing country and an emerging power, it is not suited to dealing with the world’s sole superpower.

 

Pakistan’s perception of its relationship with the United States has been framed by the view expressed first by Mr Jinnah and repeatedly believed by later leaders that “US needs Pakistan more than Pakistan needs US”. It is true that at certain periods of time, for certain specific reasons, US has “needed” Pakistan. What is forgotten is that Pakistan has “always” needed the US.

 

Pakistanis often refer to America as the ‘fairweather ally’ in contrast with their ‘allweather ally’ China. While the Pakistani narrative of US-Pakistan ties is well-known to most people, the American perspective is ignored. For decades Americans saw Pakistan as an ally, often reluctant, often demanding, but always an ally. Close military-to-military ties and intelligence cooperation lay at the core of this relationship.

 

US-Pakistan military ties were the closest during the 1980s, at the height of the anti-Soviet Afghan jihad. The loss of American interest in the region after the withdrawal of the Soviet Union from Afghanistan and the rising Pakistan-US tensions after the imposition of the Pressler Amendment strained the military-intelligence ties. While Pakistan became a frontline ally in the war on terror after 9/11, military-intelligence ties rested on shaky foundations of mistrust on both sides. There are few American and Pakistani serving military-intelligence officials who have a positive view of each other’s institutions. There has been rising anti-Americanism and a strong Islamist worldview within the Pakistani military-intelligence complex and increasing frustration with and suspicion of Pakistan on the part of Americans – military and intelligence – who have served in Afghanistan.

 

It is due to military reasons that the US and Pakistan became allies in the 1950s and the US needs Pakistan’s help today. However, military ties are also the most frayed part of the US-Pakistan relationship. A friend who you now see as an enemy is a deep wound to heal, oftentimes impossible.

 

Three top US military officials who have interacted with Pakistan during the ‘happier days’ and who have sought in the last few years to rebuild the ties with Pakistan, have in the last few months turned more and more pessimistic in their observations about US-Pakistan ties. During his December 2010 trip to Pakistan, Admiral Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, referred to “strategic impatience” with Pakistan. In his April 2011 trip, Admiral Mullen openly stated his frustration when he said, “It’s fairly well known that the ISI has a long-standing relationship with the Haqqani network. Haqqani is supporting, funding, training fighters that are killing Americans and killing coalition partners. And I have a sacred obligation to do all I can to make sure that doesn’t happen.”

 

At recent public events former National Security Advisor General (r) Jim Jones stated that Pakistan has been “reluctant” to build “close strategic ties” with US and that Pakistan’s fear of India drives its policy towards the Taliban and Afghanistan. General David Petraeus, both as head of CentCom and as the top military official in Afghanistan, has repeatedly stated that Pakistan’s military needs to move away from its ‘India obsession’ as the Taliban and Al Qaeda pose “an ever more serious threat to Pakistan’s very existence”.

 

With American troops in Afghanistan and desire for a stable Afghanistan, while strained the military-intelligence ties between the two countries will not break, the ‘good old days’ will also not return. The last few months have seen regular visits by top US military-intelligence leaders to Pakistan, including Admiral Mullen, General Petraeus, General Mattis (current CentCom chief) and Deputy Director of CIA Michael Morrell.

 

For the first time in history, civilian-to-civilian ties between US and Pakistan are stronger than the military-to-military ones. Traditionally, Pakistani civilians and liberals have seen United States as a supporter of dictators and desirous of close ties with Pakistan’s military.

 

Today with the fractious military-to-military ties, there is an opportunity for Pakistan’s civilian leadership to build close ties with the American leadership while also pushing back the army-fuelled anti-US sentiment. The civilians need to take their case to the people of Pakistan -why more US assistance will enhance Pakistan’s security and increase the people’s prosperity. The current Pakistani discussion allows the military to quietly acquiesce in US policies while letting public sentiment, fueled by selective leaks to media, serving as a source of pressure on civilian relations with the US.

 

The civilian institutions in both countries – US and Pakistan – have the same goal of a stable, peaceful and economically prosperous Pakistan. While it has often happened that civilians on both sides have desired a democratic Pakistan, this is the first time that even the American military leadership, for its own reasons, seeks a similar goal in the form of civilian supremacy over the military. While anti-Americanism is rife in Pakistan, this sentiment is a product of fuelling by certain vested institutions. The recent critique of the military-intelligence establishment from all quarters of society was unbelievable a few months ago. Similarly, statesmanlike speeches and policies by the civilian leaders – both in government and opposition – could help lessen anti-US sentiments. Assertiveness of the civilian leaders, both in domestic and foreign policy arenas, whereby they are able to slowly regain control of decision-making in turn will help broaden their base of support within the civil society, media and other institutions.

 

Aparna Pande is a research fellow focusing on South Asia at Hudson Institute, Washington, DC. Her book ‘Explaining Pakistan’s Foreign Policy: Escaping India’ (Routledge, 2011) was released recently