By Aparna Pande
This article appeared in Chowk on October 8, 2006
In the last few weeks international media has focused extensively on the memoirs of Pakistan’s President Gen Musharraf. There are many issues one can pick up to discuss from that book but from the point of view of subcontinental strategists the key issue is Gen Musharraf’s views on the Kargil conflict.
In 1999 India insisted that the Pakistani army was behind the Kargil incursion. At that time Pakistan kept insisting that the people fighting the Indian army were mujahideens, freelance freedom fighters over whom Pakistan had no control.
Seven years later Gen Musharraf offers his version of the Kargil conflict and says it was a major victory for Pakistan both militarily as well as diplomatically. Militarily the Indian army was planning an offensive and Pakistan decided to preempt the Indians. Diplomatically it served to internationalize Kashmir.
Not only Indian writers and analysts but even Pakistani analysts disagreed in 1999 and disagree even today with Gen Musharraf – not only over calling Kargil a victory but also on its impacts for Pakistan and the Kashmir issue.
According to Gen Musharraf “considered purely, in military terms, the Kargil Operations were a landmark in the history of Pakistan Army”. However, as pointed out by Gen VP Malik, India’s Chief of Army staff during the Kargil conflict, Kargil was a “tactical surprise” but a “strategic failure.”
According to Lt Gen Kamal Matinuddin “We should admit that Kargil has been a complete disaster and failure. For Air Marshal Nur Khan not only was Kargil a disaster but “There is not justification for this operation having taken place at all. Pakistan has continued to make similar mistakes and has not learnt any lesson from the blunders that its ruling cliques have been committing.”
In a recent article Lt Gen (retd) Ali Kuli Khan, former Chief of General Staff, refers to Gen Musharraf’s views on Kargil as “ostrich-like behavior.” According to Gen Musharraf during Kargil the Pakistani military took counter-measures to strengthen their defenses and that this was “a tactical marvel of military professionalism.”
Taking on Gen Musharraf’s view of Kargil, Lt Gen Ali Kuli Khan points out that there was poor conception and planning at the highest levels. Calling Kargil “the worst debacle” in Pakistan’s history he says that “countless innocent young lives were lost for nothing.”
In August 2002 the Royal United Service Institute (RUSI) journal conducted an authoritative study on Kargil. Authored by Brigadier (retd) Shaukat Qadir of the Pakistani Army it pointed out that the Pakistani army had made plans to occupy Indian territory in Kargil in November 1998. This is contrary to Gen Musharraf’s claims that Kargil was a preemptive response to a possible Indian offensive.
Brig Qadir also says that “”Pakistan decided, for some inexplicable reason, to disclaim responsibility for the incursion. Not only did this cause considerable politico-diplomatic embarrassment to Pakistan, it also made other truthful assertions suspect… (finally we) suffered the condemnation and the embarrassment of being caught in blatant falsehood.”
Diplomatically Pakistan’s credibility suffered, even with its close allies US and China. Under President Clinton US, which till then had been ambivalent about the Kashmir issue, told Pakistan sternly that borders could not be redrawn, the LoC was sacrosanct and that creating a nuclear scare would be counter-productive.
Instead of ‘internationalizing Kashmir’ and ‘forcing India’s hand’ or ‘pre-empting a Siachen type maneuver’ what happened was that India’s political, military and diplomatic response or ‘policy of restraint’ (as Gen VP Malik terms it) was commended by the global community.
Pakistan had long viewed as the underdog in conflict with its bigger and more powerful neighbor, India. Kargil, to some extent, forced the international community to rethink its views. The view taken was that Pakistan was the aggressor and India the victim and the victim was within its rights to give the aggressor a fitting reply.
In his master piece on warfare Carl von Clausewitz says “No one starts a war – or rather no one in his senses ought to do so – without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war, and how he intends to conduct it.” It seems, however, that the Pakistani military establishment did not heed Clausewitz’s warning.