By Aparna Pande
This article appeared in Indolink on September 15, 2006
Since 1947 Pakistan’s military establishment has always believed that excessive force or a ‘whiff of the grapeshot’ would solve any problem that came up. The assassination of Nawab Akbar Bugti at the hands of Pakistani security forces is an example of this. Using disproportionate force to kill a 79 year old man is not the way to win your people back but to lose even those friends you had.
Defense of the newly carved out country in 1947 gave the army a prestige and aura no other organ had. And, yes, it ably defended the frontiers in those early years. Power corrupts, however, and the uniform is no shield against that.
The soldier must yield to the civilian in matters of state and politics is a maxim as prevalent in the times of Cicero and Clausewitz as it is today. The Pakistani army establishment, however, has been brought up to view politicians as corrupt and the masses as ignorant and incapable of deciding right from wrong. In the army’s repertoire it is the sole guardian both of the internal and external frontiers of Pakistan.
General Iskander Mirza, Pakistan’s first Governor General with a military background, imposed martial law in 1958 as he did not want ‘undesirable elements’ coming to power. General Ayub, Pakistan’s first military ruler, believed that the “political chicanery, intrigue, corruption, and inefficiency manifest in every sphere of life” was what forced his hand and led the army to intervene.
General Yahya Khan, who succeeded Ayub as the military ruler in 1969, belonged to the same school of thought. Allowing elections in 1970 they were held under the assumption that the political parties were too divided for any one party to come to power. This would ensure the military’s role as the king maker. Things turned out differently. Sheikh Mujibur Rehman’s Awami League won all the seats in East Pakistan (and had an overall majority) and Zulfikar Bhutto’s Pakistan Peoples Party won majority of the seats in West Pakistan.
West Pakistani establishment’s arrogance to never let ‘these black bastards rule us’ led them to find various ways to deny legitimacy to Rehman and the Bengali majority. Suppression by force of the Bengali resistance led to an all out civil war in East Pakistan. Instead of looking at the Bengalis as fellow citizens the view of the military was ‘show them the teeth and they will be alright.’
General Zia ul Haq took power through a coup in 1977 with the aim of ‘purifying and cleansing’ Pakistani politics and stayed in power for 11 years. General Pervez Musharraf in 1999 too declared that the military had been forced to take over power to save Pakistan. Since Pakistan ‘was not ready for democracy’ he would only relinquish power when it was ‘in the national interest.’
General Yahya Khan’s brutal suppression of the Bengalis in 1970-71 exemplifies the contempt with which the military establishment has viewed its people. The indifference with which the socio-economic grievances of the East Pakistanis were treated was the major reason behind the popularity of organizations like the Awami League which promised greater autonomy. Instead of try to redress the grievances the use of brutal force to suppress a people’s uprising reflects a certain mind set which labels any form of dissent as ‘anti-national’ and ‘treason.’ Demanding more say in choosing your own representatives and asking for a greater share of the revenue than you currently have is not treason, it is the basis of democracy. The Bengalis were not anti-Pakistan; they had been the most vociferous supporters of the Pakistan movement. Unfortunately the brutal suppression of their popular uprising led to a civil war within Pakistan and a war with India in 1971 resulting in the emergence of a new country, Bangladesh.
Parallels between the 1971 Bengali uprising and the 2006 Baluch uprising have been drawn by various writers, especially after Bugti’s assassination. Differences do exist, however, though Pakistan may be in danger of ‘unraveling.’ As compared to the majority Bengali population the Baluchis are ea very small part of Pakistan’s population. The army is much more powerful today, especially in terms of equipment and technology. And yet what is similar is the attitude of the military establishment. General Musharraf’s remarks that ‘do not think it is the 1970s, you will not know what hit you’, reflected this indifference and arrogance.
What the establishment does not realize is that all it needs is one match to set an entire haystack on fire. No one foretold the Nepali uprising of April 2006. Most scholars and analysts thought that the Nepalis were ‘quiet and submissive’ people who would never revolt against their god-king. Pakistan has been facing internal tensions for a long time. The Sindhis, Muhajirs, Baluchis and Pashtus all have grievances with the federal government over many issues, including resource allocation and representation in the government.
Baluchistan may not break away and the military might soon be able to re-establish its control over the region. But Pakistan may face, sooner rather than later, a number of minor uprisings all across the country which may coalesce at one level causing a major rebellion.
Yes, Pakistanis have accepted many of the injustices and atrocities imposed upon them and have not revolted against military coups; that doesn’t mean they will not do so in the future. The more you push people and the more you take them for granted the greater is the backlash when they strike back.